m Quec.lim's republished posts.http://quec.li/~m /Spoofing Fitness Trackershttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/spoofing_fitnes.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7292Wed, 30 Sep 2015 13:02:00 -0400<p>The website <a href="http://www.unfitbits.com/index.html">Unfitbits.com</a> has a series of instructional videos on how to spoof fitness trackers, using such things as a metronome, pendulum, or power drill. With insurance companies like John Hancock <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/your-money/giving-out-private-data-for-discount-in-insurance.html">offering</a> discounts to people who allow them to verify their exercise program by opening up their fitness-tracker data, these are useful hacks.</p> <p>News <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/unfit-bits/407644/">article</a>.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7292MIT Professsor Al Drake and Pope Francishttp://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2015/09/24/mit-professsor-al-drake-and-pope-francis/http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=8883Thu, 24 Sep 2015 12:54:00 -0400http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2Ffeed%2F&entry=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2F%3Fp%3D8883Living in a Code Yellow Worldhttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/living_in_a_cod.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7289Thu, 24 Sep 2015 12:39:00 -0400<p>In the 1980s, handgun expert Jeff Cooper invented something called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Cooper#Combat_mindset_and_the_Cooper_color_code">Color Code</a> to describe what he called the "combat mind-set." Here is his summary:</p> <blockquote><p>In <strong>White</strong> you are unprepared and unready to take lethal action. If you are attacked in White you will probably die unless your adversary is totally inept. <p>In <strong>Yellow</strong> you bring yourself to the understanding that your life may be in danger and that you may have to do something about it.</p> <p>In <strong>Orange</strong> you have determined upon a specific adversary and are prepared to take action which may result in his death, but you are not in a lethal mode.</p> <p>In <strong>Red</strong> you are in a lethal mode and will shoot if circumstances warrant.</p></blockquote> <p>Cooper talked about remaining in Code Yellow over time, but he didn't write about its psychological toll. It's significant. Our brains can't be on that alert level constantly. We need downtime. We need to relax. This is why we have friends around whom we can let our guard down and homes where we can close our doors to outsiders. We only want to visit Yellowland occasionally.</p> <p>Since 9/11, the US has increasingly become Yellowland, a place where we assume danger is imminent. It's damaging to us individually and as a society.</p> <p>I don't mean to minimize actual danger. Some people really do live in a Code Yellow world, due to the failures of government in their home countries. Even there, we know how hard it is for them to maintain a constant level of alertness in the face of constant danger. Psychologist Abraham Maslow wrote about this, making safety a basic level in his <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow's_hierarchy_of_needs">hierarchy of needs</a>. A lack of safety makes people anxious and tense, and the long term effects are debilitating.</p> <p>The same effects occur when we believe we're living in an unsafe situation even if we're not. The psychological term for this is <a href="http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Do-you-know-signs-of-hypervigilance-1209950.php">hypervigilance</a>. Hypervigilance in the face of imagined danger <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3229257/">causes</a> stress and anxiety. This, in turn, <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006322399002474">alters</a> how your hippocampus functions, and <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21621333">causes</a> an excess of cortisol in your body. Now cortisol is great in small and infrequent doses, and helps you run away from tigers. But it <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453012004027">destroys</a> your brain and body if you <a href="https://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/sapolskysr-030707.html">marinate in it</a> for extended periods of time.</p> <p>Not only does trying to live in Yellowland harm you physically, it <a href="http://emotionalsurvival.com/hypervigilance.htm">changes</a> how you interact with your environment and it impairs your judgment. You forget what's normal and start seeing the enemy everywhere. Terrorism actually <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/31/terrorism-spectacle-how-states-respond-yuval-noah-harari-sapiens">relies</a> on this kind of reaction to succeed.</p> <p>Here's an example from <i>The Washington Post</i> last year: "<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-was-taking-pictures-of-my-daughters-but-a-stranger-thought-i-was-exploiting-them/2014/08/29/34831bb8-2c6c-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html">I was taking pictures of my daughters. A stranger thought I was exploiting them</a>." A father <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-was-taking-pictures-of-my-daughters-but-a-stranger-thought-i-was-exploiting-them/2014/08/29/34831bb8-2c6c-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html">wrote about</a> his run-in with an off-duty DHS agent, who interpreted an innocent family photoshoot as something nefarious and proceeded to harass and lecture the family. That the parents were white and the daughters Asian added a <a href="http://groupthink.kinja.com/man-taking-photos-of-daughters-suspected-of-being-a-per-1628709202">racist element</a> to the encounter.</p> <p>At the time, people <a href="https://reason.com/blog/2014/09/01/federal-agent-thinks-dad-taking-picture">wrote</a> <a href="http://www.infowars.com/homeland-security-agent-harasses-dad-for-taking-pictures-of-his-own-daughters/">about</a> this as an example of worst-case thinking, saying that as a DHS agent, "he's paid to suspect the worst at all times and butt in." While, yes, it was a "disturbing reminder of how the mantra of 'see something, say something' has muddied the waters of what constitutes suspicious activity," I think there's a deeper story here. The agent is trying to live his life in Yellowland, and it caused him to see predators where there weren't any.</p> <p>I call these "<a href="https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/09/terrorists_dont_do_m.html">movie-plot threats</a>," scenarios that would make great action movies but that are implausible in real life. Yellowland is filled with them.</p> <p>Last December former DHS director Tom Ridge <a href="http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-stadium-gamesmanship-20150228-story.html">wrote about</a> the security risks of building a NFL stadium near the Los Angeles Airport. His <a href="http://i.usatoday.net/sports/nfl/ridgereport.pdf">report</a> is full of movie-plot threats, including terrorists shooting down a plane and crashing it into a stadium. His conclusion, that it is simply too dangerous to build a sports stadium within a few miles of the airport, is absurd. He's been living too long in Yellowland.</p> <p>That our brains aren't built to live in Yellowland makes sense, because actual attacks are rare. The person walking towards you on the street isn't an attacker. The person doing <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_war_on_the.html">something unexpected</a> over there isn't a terrorist. Crashing an airplane into a sports stadium is more suitable to a <i>Die Hard</i> movie than real life. And the white man taking pictures of two Asian teenagers on a ferry isn't a sex slaver. (I mean, really?)</p> <p>Most of us, that DHS agent included, are complete amateurs at knowing the difference between something benign and something that's actually dangerous. Combine this with the rarity of attacks, and you end up with an overwhelming number of false alarms. This is the ultimate problem with programs like "see something, say something." They <a href="http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/mta-anti-terrorism-2012-10/">waste</a> an enormous amount of time and money.</p> <p>Those of us fortunate enough to live in a Code White society are much better served acting like we do. This is something we need to learn at all levels, from our personal interactions to our national policy. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many of our counterterrorism policies have helped convince people they're not safe, and that they need to be in a constant state of readiness. We need our leaders to <a href="https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2006/08/refuse_to_be_terrori.html">lead us out</a> of Yellowland, not to perpetuate it.</p> <p>This essay <a href="http://fusion.net/story/200747/living-in-code-yellow/">previously appeared</a> on Fusion.net.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7289Self-driving RVhttp://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2015/09/23/self-driving-rv/http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=8828Wed, 23 Sep 2015 13:38:00 -0400http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2Ffeed%2F&entry=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2F%3Fp%3D8828Birthdayhttp://xkcd.com/1581/http://xkcd.com/1581/Wed, 23 Sep 2015 00:00:00 -0400<img src="http://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/birthday.png" title="I guess I need to apologize to my parents, friends, and the staff at Chuck E. Cheese's for all the times I called the cops on them." alt="I guess I need to apologize to my parents, friends, and the staff at Chuck E. Cheese's for all the times I called the cops on them." />http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fxkcd.com%2Frss.xml&entry=http%3A%2F%2Fxkcd.com%2F1581%2FBringing Frozen Liquids through Airport Securityhttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/bringing_frozen.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7264Tue, 22 Sep 2015 14:22:00 -0400<p>Gizmodo <a href="http://gizmodo.com/what-happens-if-you-take-frozen-liquids-through-airport-1729772148">reports</a> that UK airport security confiscates frozen liquids:</p> <blockquote><p>"He told me that it wasn't allowed so I asked under what grounds, given it is not a liquid. When he said I couldn't take it I asked if he knew that for sure or just assumed. He grabbed his supervisor and the supervisor told me that 'the government does not classify that as a solid'. I decided to leave it at that point. I expect they're probably wrong to take it from me. They'd probably not seen it before, didn't know the rules, and being a bit of an eccentric request, decided to act on the side of caution. They didn't spend the time to look it up."</p></blockquote> <p>As it happens, I have a comparable recent experience. Last week, I tried to bring through a small cooler containing, among other things, a bag of ice. I expected to have to dump the ice at the security checkpoint and refill it inside the airport, but the TSA official looked at it and let it through. Turns out that frozen liquids are fine. I confirmed this with TSA officials at two other airports this week.</p> <p>One of the TSA officials even told me that what he was officially told is that liquid explosives don't freeze.</p> <p>So there you go. The US policy is more sensible. And anyone landing in the UK from the US will have to go through security before any onward flight, so there's no chance at flouting the UK rules that way.</p> <p>And while we're on the general subject, I am continually amazed by how lax the liquid rules are here in the US. Yesterday I went through airport security at SFO with an opened 5-ounce bottle of hot sauce in my carry-on. The screener flagged it; it was obvious on the x-ray. Another screener searched my bag, found it and looked at it, and then let me keep it.</p> <p>And, in general, I never bother taking my liquids out of my suitcase anymore. I don't have to when I am in the PreCheck lane, but no one seems to care in the regular lane either. It is different in the UK.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7264Anonymous Browsing at the Libraryhttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/anonymous_brows.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7275Wed, 16 Sep 2015 14:40:00 -0400<p>A rural New Hampshire library decided to install Tor on their computers and allow anonymous Internet browsing. The Department of Homeland <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/library-support-anonymous-internet-browsing-effort-stops-after-dhs-email">pressured them</a> to stop:</p> <blockquote><p>A special agent in a Boston DHS office forwarded the article to the New Hampshire police, who forwarded it to a sergeant at the Lebanon Police Department. <p>DHS spokesman Shawn Neudauer said the agent was simply providing "visibility/situational awareness," and did not have any direct contact with the Lebanon police or library. "The use of a Tor browser is not, in [or] of itself, illegal and there are legitimate purposes for its use," Neudauer said, "However, the protections that Tor offers can be attractive to criminal enterprises or actors and HSI [Homeland Security Investigations] will continue to pursue those individuals who seek to use the anonymizing technology to further their illicit activity."</p> <p>When the DHS inquiry was brought to his attention, Lt. Matthew Isham of the Lebanon Police Department was concerned. "For all the good that a Tor may allow as far as speech, there is also the criminal side that would take advantage of that as well," Isham said. "We felt we needed to make the city aware of it."</p></blockquote> <p>The good news is that the library is <a hres="http://www.vnews.com/home/18620952-95/despite-law-enforcement-concerns-lebanon-board-will-reactivate-privacy-network-tor-at-kilton-library">resisting the pressure</a> and keeping Tor running.</p> <p>This is an important issue for reasons that go beyond the New Hampshire library. The goal of the <a href="https://libraryfreedomproject.org/torexitpilotphase1/">Library Freedom Project</a> is to set up Tor exit nodes at libraries. Exit nodes help every Tor user in the world; the more of them there are, the harder it is to subvert the system. The Kilton Public Library isn't just allowing its patrons to browse the Internet anonymously; it is helping dissidents around the world stay alive.</p> <p>Librarians have been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/nsa-surveillance-librarians-privacy">protecting</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/03/librarians-wont-stay-quiet-about-government-surveillance/">our</a> <a href="http://www.thenation.com/article/librarians-versus-nsa/">privacy</a> for decades, and I'm happy to see that tradition continue.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7275How is it okay for restaurants to post Price X and then charge Price X*1.21?http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2015/09/06/how-is-it-okay-for-restaurants-to-post-price-x-and-then-charge-price-x1-21/http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=8606Sun, 06 Sep 2015 12:35:00 -0400http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2Ffeed%2F&entry=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2F%3Fp%3D8606Photoshop idea: Subtract shaded version of a subject to simulate the sun-as-spotlighthttp://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2015/09/02/photoshop-idea-subtract-shaded-version-of-a-subject-to-simulate-the-sun-as-spotlight/http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=8620Wed, 02 Sep 2015 12:14:00 -0400<p>Here&#8217;s <a href="http://blog.andreamatranga.net/2015/08/how-to-take-dramatically-lit-landscape_21.html">an idea for exploring all of the lighting possibilities for a big object</a> even when you don&#8217;t have any control over the &#8220;natural light.&#8221; (Thanks, Andrea Matranga.)</p> <p>I&#8217;m kind of shocked at how well this works.</p> <p>Readers: What do you think of the technique?</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2Ffeed%2F&entry=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.law.harvard.edu%2Fphilg%2F%3Fp%3D8620What Can you Learn from Metadata?https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/09/what_can_you_le.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7241Tue, 01 Sep 2015 07:36:00 -0400<p>An Australian reporter for the ABC, Will Ockenden <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-16/metadata-retention-privacy-phone-will-ockenden/6694152%20">published</a> a bunch of his metadata, and asked people to derive various elements of his life. They did <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-24/metadata-what-you-found-will-ockenden/6703626">pretty well</a>, even though they were amateurs, which should give you some idea what professionals can do.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7241Using Samsung's Internet-Enabled Refrigerator for Man-in-the-Middle Attackshttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/using_samsungs_.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7238Mon, 31 Aug 2015 14:56:00 -0400<p><a href="http://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/hacking-defcon-23s-iot-village-samsung-fridge/">This</a> is interesting research::</p> <blockquote><p>Whilst the fridge implements SSL, it FAILS to validate SSL certificates, thereby enabling man-in-the-middle attacks against most connections. This includes those made to Google's servers to download Gmail calendar information for the on-screen display. <p>So, MITM the victim's fridge from next door, or on the road outside and you can potentially steal their Google credentials.</p> <p>The notable exception to the rule above is when the terminal connects to the update server -- we were able to isolate the URL https://www.samsungotn.net which is the same used by TVs, etc. We generated a set of certificates with the exact same contents as those on the real website (fake server cert + fake CA signing cert) in the hope that the validation was weak but it failed.</p> <p>The terminal must have a copy of the CA and is making sure that the server's cert is signed against that one. We can't hack this without access to the file system where we could replace the CA it is validating against. Long story short we couldn't intercept communications between the fridge terminal and the update server.</p></blockquote> <p>When I <a href="https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/01/the_internet_of_thin.html">think about</a> the security implications of the Internet of things, this is one of my primary worries. As we connect things to each other, vulnerabilities on one of them affect the security of another. And because so many of the things we connect to the Internet will be poorly designed, and low cost, there will be lots of vulnerabilities in them. Expect a lot more of this kind of thing as we move forward.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7238Mickens on Securityhttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/mickens_on_secu.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7240Fri, 28 Aug 2015 16:58:00 -0400<p>James Mickens, for your <a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf">amusement</a>. A somewhat random sample:</p> <blockquote><p>My point is that security people need to get their priorities straight. The "threat model" section of a security paper resembles the script for a telenovela that was written by a paranoid schizophrenic: there are elaborate narratives and grand conspiracy theories, and there are heroes and villains with fantastic (yet oddly constrained) powers that necessitate a grinding battle of emotional and technical attrition. In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you're either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you'll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don't respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU'RE GONNA DIE AND THERE'S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they're going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that's shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they're going to hold a press conference and say "It wasn't us" as they wear t-shirts that say "IT WAS DEFINITELY US," and then they're going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. In summary, https:// and two dollars will get you a bus ticket to nowhere. Also, SANTA CLAUS ISN'T REAL. When it rains, it pours.</p></blockquote>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7240Iranian Phishinghttps://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/iranian_phishin.htmltag:www.schneier.com,2015:/blog//2.7236Thu, 27 Aug 2015 13:36:00 -0400<strong>m</strong>: <em>"The attackers also incorrectly believed that their targets would be put at their ease and lower their guards if a stranger called them and started talking in detail about the targets' lives and activities."<br /> </em><p>CitizenLab is <a href="https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/">reporting</a> on Iranian hacking attempts against activists, which include a real-time man-in-the-middle attack against Google's two-factor authentication.</p> <blockquote><p>This report describes an elaborate phishing campaign against targets in Iran's diaspora, and at least one Western activist. The ongoing attacks attempt to circumvent the extra protections conferred by two-factor authentication in Gmail, and rely heavily on phone-call based phishing and "real time" login attempts by the attackers. Most of the attacks begin with a phone call from a UK phone number, with attackers speaking in either English or Farsi. <p>The attacks point to extensive knowledge of the targets' activities, and share infrastructure and tactics with campaigns previously linked to Iranian threat actors. We have documented a growing number of these attacks, and have received reports that we cannot confirm of targets and victims of highly similar attacks, including in Iran. The report includes extra detail to help potential targets recognize similar attacks. The report closes with some security suggestions, highlighting the importance of two-factor authentication.</p></blockquote> <p>The report quotes my previous writing on the vulnerabilities of two-factor authentication:</p> <blockquote><p>As researchers have observed for at least a decade, a range of attacks are available against 2FA. <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/the_failure_of.html">Bruce Schneier anticipated in 2005</a>, for example, that attackers would develop real time attacks using both man-in-the-middle attacks, and attacks against devices. The"real time" phishing against 2FA that Schneier anticipated were reported at least <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/07/13/2-factor_phishing_attack">9 years ago.</a> <p>Today, <a href="https://securityintelligence.com/real-time-phishing-takes-off/#.VdOTBHhh1Bw">researchers regularly point out the rise of "real-time" 2FA phishing</a>, much of it in the context of online fraud. A 2013 academic article provides a<a href="https://www.mulliner.org/collin/publications/mulliner_dimva2013.pdf"> systematic overview of several of these </a>vectors. These attacks can take the form of theft of 2FA credentials from devices (e.g. "<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16812064">Man in the Browser</a>" attacks), or by using 2FA login pages. Some of the malware-based campaigns that target 2FA have been tracked for<a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/zeus-now-bypasses-two-factor-authentication/"> several years</a>, are highly involved, and involve <a href="https://www.duosecurity.com/blog/answer-to-otp-bypass-out-of-band-two-factor-authentication">convincing targets to install separate Android </a>apps to capture one-time passwords. Another category of these attacks works by exploiting <a href="http://www.itnews.com.au/News/282310,45k-stolen-in-phone-porting-scam.aspx">phone number changes</a>, <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/01/20/indian-two-factor-authentication-fraudsters-busted-by-delhi-cops/">SIM card registrations</a>, and <a href="http://shubh.am/how-i-bypassed-2-factor-authentication-on-google-yahoo-linkedin-and-many-others/#concept">badly protected voicemail</a></p></blockquote> <p>Boing Boing <a href="http://boingboing.net/2015/08/27/elaborate-spear-phishing-attem.html">article</a>. Hacker News <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10128821">thread</a>.</p>http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.schneier.com%2Fblog%2Fatom.xml&entry=tag%3Awww.schneier.com%2C2015%3A%2Fblog%2F%2F2.7236matt [wronka.org] People Centric Phone UIhttp://quec.es/org.wronka/matt/2015/08/27/Thu, 27 Aug 2015 13:02:55 +0000;matt [wronka.org]Thu, 27 Aug 2015 09:02:00 -0400An article from 2013, suggesting people-centric phone UI: <br /> <a href="http://tantek.com/2013/338/b1/people-focused-mobile-communication-experience">http://tantek.com/2013/338/b1/people-focused-mobile-communication-experience</a><br /> <br /> This seems so incredibly obvious, that only after seeing the iOS screenshots did I realize that <a href="http://quec.es/t/apple/">Apple</a> doesn't (hasn't?) had this feature. I've had groups or individuals on my <a href="http://quec.es/t/s60/">S60</a> phone for years, and <a href="http://quec.es/t/maemo/">Maemo</a> (~2011) had you select a person, and then a protocol for communication (<a href="http://quec.es/t/pots/">POTS</a>, <a href="http://quec.es/t/sms/">SMS</a>, <a href="http://quec.es/t/xmpp/">XMPP</a>, <a href="http://quec.es/t/aim/">AIM</a>, <a href="http://quec.es/t/irc/">IRC</a>, <a href="http://quec.es/t/skype/">Skype</a>,etc.). The <a href="http://quec.es/t/maemo/">Maemo</a> implementation sounds exactly like what's suggested, where you can select the person, and for protocols with status (<a href="http://quec.es/t/sip/">SIP</a>, <a href="http://quec.es/t/xmpp/">XMPP</a>, etc.) see if the person is online, and send a message. Or send an eMail instead.http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fquec.es%2Forg.wronka%2Fmatt%2Fsynd%2F&entry=Thu%2C+27+Aug+2015+13%3A02%3A55+%2B0000%3Bmatt+%5Bwronka.org%5Dmatt [wronka.org]http://quec.es/org.wronka/matt/2015/08/23/Sun, 23 Aug 2015 16:37:40 +0000;matt [wronka.org]Sun, 23 Aug 2015 12:37:00 -0400SNESes in Mr. <a href="http://quec.es/t/robot/">Robot</a>'s <a href="http://quec.es/t/mirrors/">Mirrors</a> seem awfully yellowed for a &lt; 4 year old system.http://quec.li/EntryComments?feed=http%3A%2F%2Fquec.es%2Forg.wronka%2Fmatt%2Fsynd%2F&entry=Sun%2C+23+Aug+2015+16%3A37%3A40+%2B0000%3Bmatt+%5Bwronka.org%5D